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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LYNN C. STEPHENSON,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
vs.
JOHN E. WARNER and
STEVE F. GREENWOOD,
Defendants and
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 15,333

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for personal injuries sustained by
Appellant, Lynn C. Stephenson, while he was cleaning a service
station floor with gasoline at his place of employment.

Appellant

sued his employer, John E. Warner, who carried no workmen's
compensation insurance.

Appellant also sued Respondent, Steve

F. Greenwood, who owned and had leased the service station to
John E. Warner.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury before the Honorable
J. Robert Bullock, Fourth Judicial District Court Judge.
the end of the evidence, and upon all parties resting, and
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At

Respondent having moved for a directed verdict, the Court
directed a verdict in favor of Respondent, Steve F. Greenwoo,
The case against the employer, John E. Warner, was submitted
to a jury, which returned a verdict against the employer and
in favor of Appellant, and awarded damages.
The Appellant does not appeal this judgment agains
his employer.

The Appellant appeals as to the directed verd.

granted to Respondent Greenwood.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent Steve F. Greenwood requests this Court
to affirm the judgment on the directed verdict rendered in h
favor by the Trial Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's Statement of Facts is inaccurate and
misleading.

Therefore, Respondent, Steve F. Greenwood, is

compelled to submit the following Statement of Facts.
On May 6, 1972, Plaintiff-Appellant Lynn C. Stephe
was employed by Defendant John E. Warner at John's Conoco
Service Station in Nephi, Utah.

(T. 68)

On that date, Step

was using gasoline to clean the service station floor when
explosion and fire occurred, injuring him.

(T. 117-119)

- 2-
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a

He

blames the accident on a car wash water heater, which he claims
was positioned incorrectly in the station.
The service station in question was leased and operated
by Warner.

(T. 51-52, 77)

He had leased the station from

Defendant-Respondent Steve F. Greenwood.

(T.

77)

Greenwood

was the owner of the station, but he was not the owner of the car
washing equipment or its hot water heater.
items belonged to Warner.

(T. 80- 81, 53)

(T. 40, 53)

These

The relationship

between Warner and Greenwood was simply one of lessee-lessor.
(T.

77, 40)

Greenwood's only interest was rent.

(T. 40)

At the commencement of the Warner lease, the service
station consisted of an office, a supply room, two lubrication
bays, and an open "addition" attached to one end of the building,
which was used for car washing purposes.

(Ex. P-2)

room housed the car wash hot water heater.

The supply

The supply room floor

was 6 inches higher than the rest of the station (T. 93, Ex. D-3)
and was separated from the lubrication bays, as well as the rest
of the station, by a wall.

(Ex. P-2, T. 63, 84)

room wall was removed by Warner prior to the fire.
Stephenson helped Warner tear down the wall.

This supply
(T. 63-65)

(T. 65, 86)

Warner had asked Greenwood for permission to remove the wall, and
Greenwood had given it.

(T. 63-64)

However, Greenwood left

- 3-
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the entire matter in Warner's hands.

(T.

85-86)

Greenwood~

not present when the wall was removed, nor did he visit the
premises after its removal.

(T. 65-66)

Warner stored "full" cans of oil and cleaners in
the supply area.

Such cleaners were removed to other areas c

the station when used.

(T. 84-85)

Warner stored in the storeroom.

Greenwood never observed

(T. 58)

It is unknown what

the prior lessee had stored in the said supply room.
In addition to the water heater, located in the sut
room area, a compressor was located above the first lubricat1
bay near the furnace, at ceiling level.

(Ex. P-2)

Also, it

was common for Stephenson and Warner to throw their cigarettt
on the station floor.

(T. 87)

At the time of the accident, Stephenson was cleanir
the floor of the first lubrication bay with gasoline when
explosion and fire occurred.

t~

(T. 117-119)

Stephenson does not know what caused the fire.
Warner does not know what caused the fire.

( T . 8 8)

(T.

The fin

chief found no physical evidence as to the cause of the fire
(_T. 98)

The source of ignition was unknown to the fire chier

but he stated it could have been a cigarette on the floor,
compressor near the ceiling, or the said water heater.
-101)

e

(T.

He was of the opinion, based upon what others had tol
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him, that the gasoline fumes were ignited by the water heater.
(T. 98-99)

He testified that it was dangerous to clean with

gasoline inside such buildings, since gasoline fumes can spread
throughout the building to a source of ignition.

(T. 102)

Stephenson had prior knowledge of gasoline and its
dangerous propensities, and testified that he knew not to use
gasoline to clean near water heaters.

(T. 135-136, 139-140)

He was aware of the said water heater and its pilot light prior
to the fire.

(T. 140)

After the accident, Stephenson filed suit against his
employer, Warner.

Warner carried no workmen's compensation

insurance.

Stephenson also filed suit against the landlord,

Greenwood.

Stephenson claims that Greenwood was the owner

of the water heater in question, and that he was negligent in
regard to its location and in allowing Warner to remove the
wall that separated the supply room containing the water heater
from the rest of the station.

(Appellant's Brief)

Greenwood was not the owner of the car washing
equipment or its water heater.

(T. 39, 40, 81)

The water

heater in question, and its associated car washing equipment,
had originally been purchased and installed in the station by
the prior lessee, Joe Allen.

(T. 28, 38)

The said equipment

-5-
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was installed by the company that sold Allen the equipment.
(T. 28)

The heater was installed in the supply room which, a

that time, was separated from the rest of the service station
by a wall.

It was this wall which was removed by Warner and

Stephenson.

(Ex. P-2, T. 63-65, 86)

The supply room

6 inches higher than the rest of the station.

floor~

(T. 93, Ex. D-

The rest of the car washing equipment was installed in the op
"addition" at the side of the station.

Allen had requested

that Greenwood build the said "addition" for Allen's car
washing equipment.

(T. 38)

Greenwood built the addition and

charged Allen additional $40.00 a month rent for the same.
(T. 27-28, 38-39)

The car washing equipment, including its

heater, was installed after the "addition" had been built.
(T. 106)

This was some time after December 22, 1970.

(Ex.

Allen had purchased the said car washing equipment
by making a loan at the bank.

(T. 38-39)

However, the bank

would not loan Allen the money without a co-signer on the not
(T. 39)
his loan.

Greenwood co-signed the note to allow Allen to make
(T. 39, Ex. P-1)

in the said equipment.
the equipment.

(T.

Greenwood had no ownership inter

(T. 39)

Greenwood has never operated

37)

When Joe Allen died, Warner took over the station a
lessee.

(T. 52)

The terms of the lease were the same as the

had been between Allen and Greenwood.

-6-
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Warner purcha
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the car washing equipment, with its water heater.

(T. 39, 53-54)

Warner purchased the said car washing equipment and heater
by paying off Allen's note at the bank and making a new loan.
(T. 54)

However, the bank would not make a loan to Warner unless

he had a co-signer on the note.

(T. 39, 54)

the note so that Warner could make his loan.
had no ownership in the said equipment.
ment was solely Warner's.

(T. 80-81)

Greenwood co-signed
(T. 54)

(T. 40, 81)

Greenwood
The equip-

Warner testified that

the equipment was his alone, (T. 80-81) and that he could have
moved the said equipment at any time to another location.
(T. 80-81)

When Warner subsequently gave up the station, he

sold the equipment to the new lessee.

(T. 45, 81)

When the new

lessee failed to make payments on the said car washing equipment,
Warner personally locked the said-equipment with a lock and
key and would not release the same until the payments were made
and his equity paid in full.

(T. 81-82)

At no time during the trial did Stephenson offer
into evidence city codes or building ordinances.

At the end

of all evidence, Greenwood moved for a directed verdict.

(T. 158)

Stephenson then requested the Trial Court to take judicial
notice of old Nephi ordinances and building codes.
or evidence was offered in regard thereto.

No testimony

(Trial Transcript.)

-7-
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The Trial Court granted Defendant-Respondent
Greenwood's motion for directed verdict.

(T. 167)

The Trial Court then submitted the matter to the
jury, which returned a verdict in favor of Stephenson and
against his employer, Warner, and awarded damages accordingly
(T. 184, R. 155)

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DIRECTING
THE VERDICT IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT GREENWOOD AND AGAINST
APPELLANT.
Stephenson claims that the landlord, Greenwood, she
be liable, upon the grounds that the water heater in question
was situated in violation of Nephi City Ordinances.

He furtt

claims that the 1964 Uniform Building Code is applicable, and
required a flame or pilot light to be at least 24 inches abo1
the floor in rooms where flammables were stored or used.

The

Nephi City Ordinances are not in evidence and are not applica
as will be discussed in Point II.
However, even assuming that the ordinances and buil
code apply, as claimed by Appellant, the evidence clearly she
without question of fact, that the water heater was purchasec
and installed by the prior lessee, Joe Allen, and at that tirr
was not in violation of the said city ordinances or alleged

- 8Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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building code relied upon by Appellant.

Furthermore, when

the station was leased to Warner, Warner purchased the water
heater and car washing equipment, and the said water heater
was not in violation of the said city ordinances or building
code at that time.
When the service station was leased to Warner, the
water heater was located in a separate room from the rest of
the station.
station )2z

The said room was separated from the rest of the

~wall.

Furthermore, the floor of the said room

was 6 inches higher than the rest of the station.

Subsequently,

the lessee, Warner, asked Greenwood for permission to tear
down the wall which separated the said room from the rest of
the station.

Greenwood gave Warner permission to remove the

wall, but left the entire matter in Warner's hands.

It was

Warner who, with the help of Appellant Stephenson, tore down
the wall.
With the wall removed, the supply room then became
part of the larger room housing the two lubrication bays, as
well as what once had been the supply room, with its water
heater,
Since the removal of the wall was left up to the
lessee, Warner, and since Warner was the one that removed
the said wall, he had the responsibility to assure that such
alterations did not result in a violation of the city ordinances
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or building code.

If by removal of the wall, the water

heater became subject to the code by then being located in
the same room where flammables were used or stored, and there·
fore was required to be 24 inches off the floor as alleged by
Appellant, it was the responsibility of the lessee, Warner,
to adjust the heater accordingly.
Greenwood did not participate or observe the remova:
of the wall, nor did he visit the premises after the change
was made.

Furthermore, Greenwood had no knowledge of what

Warner stored in the supply area.
As stated in 49 Am. Jur. Zd, Landlord and Tenants,
Sec. 786:
A landlord is not deemed to be the principal
of his tenant, and he is not responsible
for his tenant's torts, active or negligent,
or for his tenant's failure to keep the
premises in repair. The landlord is not
liable for injuries, to a person on the
premises in the right of the tenant, caused
by a defect in the premises which results
from an act of the tenant.
The general law is well stated in the Restatment of
Torts, Sec. 355, which reads as follows:
. . . A lessor of land is not subject to
liability to his lessee or others upon the land
with the consent of the lessee or sub-lessee
for physical harm caused by any dangerous condi
which comes into existence after the lessee has
taken possession.
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However, even if the alleged defect had existed
at the time the premises were leased to Warner, the lessor, Greenwood, still could not be held liable.

The general law is well

stated in Restatement of Torts, Sec. 356, which reads as follows:
A lessor of land is not liable to his
lessee or to others on the land for physical
harm caused by any dangerous condition,
whether natural or artificial, which existed
when the lessee took possession.
49 Am. Jr. Zd, Sec. 780, Landlord and Tenant, page
722, states it this way:
At common law, subject to certain exceptions,
the occupier or tenant, and not the landlord, is liable for injuries to a third
person, on or off the premises, caused by
the condition or use of the demised premises.
It is the well-settled general rule that
the duties and liabilities of the landlord
to persons on the leased premises by the
consent of the tenant are the same as those
owed to the tenant himself; for this purpose
they stand in his shoes. This rule applies
to the tenant's wife, child, or other members
of the tenant's family. Where the tenant
has no redress against the landlord, those
on the premises in the tenant's rights are
likewise barred. Visitors, customers,
servants, employees, invitees, and licensees
in general of the tenant are on the premises
as guests, etc. of the tenant and not of
the landlord. Whatever rights such invitation
or license from the lessee may confer as
against such lessee, it can, as against
the lessor, give no greater right than the
lessee himself has. Accordingly, it is a
general rule that the landlord is not liable
to persons on the premises in the right of
the tenant for injuries from defects in the
condition of the demised premises. This
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rule has been deemed to extend even to
structural defects. Thus, a lessor is not,
as a general rule, responsible for injuries
to third persons in privity with the tenant
which are caused by failure to keep or put the
demised premises in good repair--in other
words, for injuries caused by defects arising
before or during the term from failure to
make repairs. These rules apply to the
tenant's employees, even though the property
is leased for a business purpose . .
The same annotator, at Sec. 771, states the followi
while citing a Utah case as one of numerous authorities:
The logical conclusion from the principle
that the landlord is under no implied
obligation as to the condition of the
demised premises or as to the repair of
defects therein is that the landlord is not
responsible to the tenant for injuries to
p.erson or property caused by defects in
the demised premises where the landlord
had not made any warranty or contract as
to the condition of the demised premises
or as to the repair of defects and is
guilty of no willful wrong or fraud.
(Citing numerous cases, including Wilson
v. Woodruff, 65 Ut. 118, 235 P. 368.)
In Wilson v. Woodruff, supra, a Utah case, the defE
were owners of a two-story brick building in the business sec
of Salt Lake City.

There was evidence that the east wall of

the building was defectively constructed.

That portion of tr

building collapsed, causing injury to the lessee.

This Hono1

Court stated:
The general proposition is well settled
that in the absence of warranty, deceit,
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or fraud on the part of the landlord,
the lessee takes the risk of the quality
of the premises, and cannot make the
landlord answerable for any injuries
sustained by him during his occupancy by
reason of the defective condition of the
premises or their faulty construction
The Utah Supreme Court further stated:
We think the evidence in this case clearly
shows that the injuries sustained resulted
from defects in the premises demised to
plaintiff, which risk he assumed when he
entered under his lease.
The Restatement of Torts, Sec. 356, states it
this way:
. . . A lessor of land is not liable to his
lessee or to others on the land for physical
harm caused by any dangerous condition,
whether natural or artificial, which
existed when the lessee took possession.
Therefore, even if the alleged defect had existed at
the time the premises were leased to Warner by Greenwood,
Greenwood still would not be liable.
case.

However, such is not the

When the premises were leased to Warner, no defect existed

even under the ordinances and building codes relied upon by
the Appellant.

If there was any violation of such ordinances

and codes, such came into being only after the lessee, with
the help of the Appellant, Stephenson, altered the leased
premises in the removal of the wall and door.

-13-
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The Appellant, in his brief, claims that Greenwood
created a nuisance, and relied upon the case of Larson v.
Calder's Park Co., 54 Ut. 325, 108 p. 559.

There, a building

had been used for eight years as a shooting gallery, and had
been a dangerous nuisance for many years.

.s.

It was common for

bullets to pass through the cracks and holes in the wall of
the building, and such facts were known to the landlord.

Wh~

the landlord leased the premises, he did so with the knowledhere
that the building was a nuisance, that the public passed in
back of the building, and that the new tenant would continue
to use the building as a shooting gallery and, therefore, the
would be a continuation of the nuisance.
has no application to the case at bar.

However, such

cas~

Ours is not a case of

nuisance, but even if it were, there was no nuisance when the
car washing equipment was installed by Joe Allen, nor when t! ~

1

premises were leased to Warner.

If a nuisance ever existed,

it was after Warner and Stephenson tore down the supply room
wall, therein exposing the heater flame to the rest of the
service station, including the lubrication areas.
Furthermore, Larson v. Calder's Park Co., supra,
preceded Wilson v. Woodruff, supra, and Montoya v. Berthana
Investment Corp., 21 Ut. 2d 37, 439 P.2d 853.

It will be

recalled in Wilson v. Woodruff, supra, that the defective
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1101-1102

Chapter 11
REQUIREMENTS FOR GROUP F OCCUPANCIES
NOTE: Tables in Chapter 11 appear at the end of the Chapter.

Group F Occupancies Defined
Sec. 1101. Group F Occupancies shall be:
Division I. GasoHgc §ery~e stations, storage garages where no repair work is done except exc ange ot parts and maintenance requiring
no open flame, welding, or the use of highly flammable liquids.
Division 2. Wholesale and retail stores, office buildings, drinking
and dining establishments having an occupant load of less than 100,
printing plants, municipal police and fire stations, factories and workshops using materials not highly flammable or combustible, storage and
sales rooms for combustible goods, paint stores without bulk handling.
(Sec Section 402 for definition of Assembly Buildings.)
Buildings or portions of buildings having rooms used for educational
purposes beyond the 12th grade with less than 50 occupants in any
room.
Di vision 3. Aircraft hangars where. no repair work is.done except
exchange of parts and maintenance requiring no open flame, welding,
or the use of highly flammable liquids.
Open parking garages.
Heliports.
For occupancy separations see Table No. 5-B.
For occupant load see Section 3301.
Construction, Height, and Allowable Area
Sec. II 02. (a) General. Buildings or parts of buildings classed in
Croup F because of the use or character of the occupancy shall be
limited to the types of construction set forth in Tables No. 5-C and No.
.S·D and shall not exceed, in area or height, the limits specified in
Sections .SOS, 506, and 507.
Other provisions of this Code notwithstanding, a Group F, Division
I Occupancy located in the basement or first story of a building housing a Group F, Division 2 or a Group H Occupancy may be classed as
a separate and distinct building for the purpose of area limitation,
limitation of number of stories and Type of Construction, when all of
the following conditions are met:
I. The Group F, Division I Occupancy is of Type I Construction.
2. There is a Three-Hour Occupancy Separation between the
Group F, Division I Occupancy and all portions of the Croup F,
Division 2 or Group H Occupancy.
3. The Group F, Division 1 Occupancy is devoted to the storage of
passenger vehicles (having a capacity of not more than nine
persons per vehicle), but may contain laundry rooms and mechanical equipment rooms incidental to the operation of the
building.
Sponsored by the
S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1970 EDITION

SECTIONS 1108-1109

of the floori~ ~ny rqgm ip \ybjsb yg1PHle flpmmphle Uq11jd5 Special
are used or s} [d.
Hazards
Every boiler room or room containing a central heating (Continued)

phmt shall be separated from the rest of the building by not
less than a One-Hour Fire-Resistive Occupancy Separation as
defined in Chapter 5 with openings protected as specified in
Section 3.320.
EXCEPTION: Buildings not more than one story in
height of Croup F, Division 2 Occupancy with an occupant
load of less than 30.
Sec. 1109. (a) Scope. Except where speciflc provisions Open
are made in the following Subsections, other requirements of Parking
this Code shall apply.
Garages
(b) Definition. For the purpose of this Section, an open
parking garage is a structure of Type I, II, or IV construction
more than one tier in height which is at least 50 per cent
open on two or more sides and is used exclusively for the
parking or storage of passenger motor vehicles having a
capacity of not more than nine persons per vehicle.
Open parking garages are further classifled as either rampaccess or mechanical-access. Ramp-access open parking
garages are those employing a series of continuously rising
Hoors or a series of interconnecting ramps between floors permitting the movement of vehicles under their own power
from and to the street level. Mechanical-access parking garages
.ire those employing parking machines, lifts, elevators. or other
mechanical devices for vehicles moving from and to street
1'.·1·el and in which public occup.mcy is prohibited above the
street level.
( c) Construction. Construction shall be of noncombustible
materials. Open parking garages shall meet the design re1 p1ireml"nts of Chapter 23. Adequate curbs and railings shall
he- provided at every opening.
(d) Area and Height. Area and height of open parking
g.1rages in Fire Zones No. I, No. 2, and No. 3 shall be limited
as set forth in Table No. 11-A except for increases allowed
by Subsection (e).
In structures having a spiral or sloping floor, the horizontal
projection of the stmcture at anv cross section shall not exceed
the allowable area per parking 'tier. In the case of a strncturc
ho.1·ing a continuous spiral floor, each 9 feet 6 inches of height
or portion thereof shall be considered as a tier.
The clear height of a parking tier shall be not less than 6
feet 6 inches, except that a lesser clear height m•lY be permitted in mechanical-access open parldng garages when approved by the Building Official.
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SECTIONS 1105-1108

Light,
Ventilation,
and
Sanitation
(Continued)

UNIFORM BUILDING CODE
EXCEPTIO~:

In storage garages and aircraft hangars
not exceeding an area of 5000 square· feet, the Building Official may authorize the omission of such ventilating equip·
ment where, in his opinion, the building is supplied with unobstructed op~nings to the outer air which are suffici~nt to
provide the necessary ventilation.

Every building or portion thereof where persons are employed shall be provided with at least one water closet. Separate facilities shall be provided for each sex when the number
of employees exceeds four and both sexes are employed. Such
toilet facilities shall be located either in such building or conveniently in a building adjacent thereto on the same property.
Such water closet rooms in connection with food establishments where food is prepared, stored, or served, shall have a
nonabsorbent interior finish on floors, walls, and ceilings, shall
be separated from such food establishments with close-fitting,
tight doors and shall have hand washing facilities therein or
adjacent thereto.
All water closet rooms shall be provided \dth an exterior
window at least 3 square feet in area, fully openable; or a vertical duct not less than 100 square inches in area for the first
toilet facility with an additional .50 square inches for each additional toilet facility; or a mechanically operated exhaust
system, which is connected to the light switch, capable of
providing a complete change of air every 15 minutes. Such
systems shall be vented to the outside air and at the point of
discharge shall be at least 5 feet from any openable window.
For other requirements on water clo~ets, see Section 1711.
Shaft
Enclosures

Sec. 1106. Exits shall be enclost-cl as specified in Chapter 33.
Elevator shafts, vent shafts, and other vertical openings
shall be enclosed, and the enclosure shall be as specified in
Section 1706.

Fire·
Extinpishing
Systems

· Sec. II07. When required by other provisions of this Code,
automatic fire-extinguishing systems and standpipes shall be
installed as specified in Chapter 38.

*

Sec. ll08. Chimners and heating apparatus shall confo1m
to the requirements of Chapter 37 of thi• Code and Uniform
Building Code, Volume II, Mechanical.
No storage of volatile flammable liquids shall be allowed
in Group F Occupancies and the handling and use of gasoline,
fuel oil and other flammable liquids shall not be pem1itted
in any Group F Occupancy unless such use and handling
comply with U.B.C. Standard No. 9-1.
Devices generating a glow or flame capable of igniting
gasoline vapor shall not be installed or used within 18 inches
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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SECTIONS 1101·1102

UNIFORM BUILDING CODE

CHAPTER 11-REQUIREMENTS FOR GROUP F OCCUPANCIES
NOTE: Tables in Chapter 11 appear at the end of the Chapter.
Group F
Occupancies
Defined

Sec. llOl. Group F Oc:cupancies shall be:
Division I. Gas~ipe 5ecyifG st9tj9ns storage garages \vhere
no repair workis one except exchange of parts and maintenance requiring no open flame, welding, or the use of highly
flammable liquids.
Division 2. Wholesale and retail stores, office buildings,
drinking and dining establishments having an occupant load
of less than 100, printing plants, municipal police and llre
stations, factories and workshops using materials not highly
flammable or combustible, storage and sales rooms for combustible goods, paint stores without bulk handling. (See Section 402, for definition of Assembly Buildings.)
Buildings or portions of buildings having rooms used for
educational purposes, beyond the 12th grade with less than
50 occupants in any room.
Division 3. Aircraft hangars where no repair work is done
except exchange of parts and maintenance requiring no open
Bame, welding, or the use of highly flammable liquids.
Open parking garages.
Heliports.
For occupancy separations see Table No. 5-B.
For occupant load see Section 3301.

Sec. ll02. (a) General. Buildings or parts of buildings
classed in Group F because of the use or character of the occu·
pancy shall be limited to the types of construction set forth
in Tables No. 5-C and No. 5-D and shall not exceed, in area
or height, the limits specified in Sections 505, 506, and 507.
Other provisions of this Code notwithstanding, a Group F,
Division l Occupancy located in the basement or flrst story
of a building housing a Group F, Division 2 or a Group H
Occupancy may be classed as a separate and distinct building
for the purpose of area limitation, limitation of number of
stories and Type of Construction, when all of the following
conditions are met:
1. The Group F, Division 1 Occupancy is of Type I Construction;
2. There is a Three-Hour Occupancy Separation between
the Group F, Division 1 Occupancy and all portions of
the Group F, Division 2 or Group H Occupancy.
3. The Group F, Division 1 Occupancy is devoted to the
storage of passenger vehicles (having a capacity of not
more than nine persons per vehicle), but may contain
laundry rooms and mechanical equipment rooms incidental to the operation of the building.
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CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the Trial Court
did not err in granting Respondent Greenwood's motion for a
directed verdict.
Dated this

,/

d:r:,.
/-

day of January, 1978.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON, RUSSON, HANSON,& DUNN

-,
/

.'

,
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,
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LEONARD H. RUSSON ,
Attorneys for Defendant-Responden1
702 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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Since the supply room floor was 6 inches above the
floor of the rest of the station, where flammables and oils
were used, and the flame of the water heater was 16 inches
above the supply room floor, the said water heater, even after
Warner altered the premises prior to the fire, more than met
the requirements of the Uniform Building Code.
The evidence is clear, without question of fact,
that at the time Greenwood leased the station to Warner, there
was no violation of the Nephi City Ordinances or the 1964
Uniform Building Code relied upon by Appellant.

The heater

in question was housed in a separate room from the rest of
the station.

Greenwood had no knowledge of what Warner used

or stored in the supply room which housed the heater.

If

there was any violation of Nephi City Ordinances or the 1964
Uniform Building Code, it was created when Warner, with the he!
of Appellant Stephenson, tore down the wall separating the
su~ply

room from the rest of the station where flammables were

used.
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a fuel shall be separated from the
rest of the building by not less than
a 1 hour fire-resistive occupancy separation
as defined in chapter S.
The 1964 Building Code relied upon by the Appellant
states that devices generating a flame are not to be used or
installed within 24 inches of the floor "in any room in which
volatile flammable liquids are used or stored."

It was the

obligation of the lessee not to store or use flammable liquids
in the supply room where the heater was unless the heater was
more than 24 inches above the floor.

Warner testified during

the trial that Greenwood was never in his supply room, and had
no knowledge of what he stored or used in that room.

(T. 65-67)

Furthermore, when Warner leased the station, the
said supply room was separated from the rest of the station by
a wall.

Warner and Appellant Stephenson, themselves, removed

that wall.

If, by the removal of the wall, a defective or

dangerous condition was created, it was the obligation of Warner,
the lessee, to correct the same.
Furthermore, the 1970 Edition of the Uniform Building
Code and the 1973 Edition of the Uniform Building Code changed
the requirement from 24 inches to 18 inches.

(See Appendix A)

That requirement now reads:
Devices generating a glor or flame
capable of igniting gasoline vapors
shall not be installed or used within
18 inches of the floor in any room in
which volatile flammable liquids or
gas are used or stored.
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Appellant, on page 8 of his brief, claims that
Greenwood "was a principal actor" and "by affirmative conduct"
removed the separation wall in question, therein creating a
nuisance.

This is contrary to the evidence.

The evidence is

clear, without question of fact, that Warner and Stephenson
removed the wall in question.

(T. 63-65, 85-86)

Appellant quotes from the 1964 Uniform Building Code,
but leaves out language which alters the meaning of the said
section.

Section 1108 states:
Sec. 1108. Chimneys and heating apparatus
shall conform to the requirements of
Chapter 1 of the 1964 edition of Volume I
of the Uniform Building Code and Chapter
23 of this Code.
No storage of volatile flammable liquids
shall be allowed in Group F occupancies and
the handling and use of gasoline, fuel oil
and other flammable liquid shall not be
permitted in any Group F occupancy unless
such use and handling comply with U.B.C.
Standard No. 9-1-64.
Devices generating a glow or flame capable
of igniting gasoline vapor shall not be
installed or used within 24 inches of the
floor in any room in which volatile flammable
liquids are used or stored.
Every boiler room or room containing a
central heating plant using solid or liquid
fuel shall be separated from the rest of
the building by a 2 hour fire-resistive
occupancy separation as defined in chapter
5. Every boiler room or room containing
a central heating plant which burns gas as
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Respondent Greenwood submits that neither the 1951
City Ordinances of Nephi or the 1964 Uniform Building Code,
relied upon by Appellant, are in evidence or properly before
the Court.

Furthermore, Respondent submits that even if the

said ordinances and building codes were in evidence, such
have no applicability here, since the building, when leased
to Warner, was not in violation of the same.
B.

Contrary to Claims of Appellant, Respondent

Greenwood Did Not Create A Nuisance

Nor Did He Violate Ordinance

of Nephi City.
Appellant makes several inaccurate statements under
Point II of his brief.

He alleges on page 7 that Greenwood

"determined" and "caused" the wall separating the supply room
from the lubrication bays to be removed.

The evidence is clear

that during the tenure of the lease, the lessee, Warner, asked
Greenwood if he could remove the wall, and Greenwood said that
he could, but left it completely up to Warner,

(T. 63-64, 85-86)

Warner, and Stephenson, the Appellant, physically removed the
wall in question.

(T. 63-65, 86)

On page 1 of his brief, Appellant claims that
Greenwood was the owner of the car washing equipment and water
heater.

However, the evidence is clear that Warner was the

owner of the same.

(T.

80-81, 53, 40)
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(b)

* * *

(c) Other Proof. This rule does not
prevent the proof of official records
or of entry or lack of entry therein
by any method authorized by any applicable
statute or by the rules of evidence at
common law.
(d) Certified Copy of Record Read in
Evidence. A copy of any official record,
or entry therein, in the custody of a
public officer of this state, or of the
United States, certified by the officer
having custody thereof, to be a full, true
and correct copy of the original in his
custody, may be read in evidence in an
action or proceeding in the courts of this
state, in like manner and with like effect
as the original could be if produced.
At no time, during the trial or after, was the
official publication of the ordinances, or a copy attested to
by the official having custody, or his deputy, offered into evic
as required by Rule 44(a).
A~no

time, during the trial or after, was a copy of

the official record, certified by the custodian to be a full
and true and correct copy of the same, read into evidence as
require4 by Rule 44(d).
At no time, during the evidenciary portion of the tri:
or thereafter, was any testimony or evidence offered as to
amendments, or lack thereof, to the 1951 Nephi Ordinances, or a:
to the foundation of the 1951 ordinances, or as to the adoption
of the 1964 Uniform Building Code relied upon by Appellant, or
of subsequent Uniform Building Codes.

-21-
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The Utah Rules of Evidence further declare that
the determination as to whether or not judicial notice be granted
"shall be a matter for the judge and not for the jury."

(Rule

10(4) Utah Rules of Evidence.)
Rule 44, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as
Rule 68 of the Rules of Evidence, set forth the requirements
of proof of official records.

Official record is defined by

the said rules to mean "all public writings, including laws,
judicial records, all official documents, and public records
of private writings."

The said rule provides:

44. (a) Authentication of Copy. An
official record or an entry therein, when
admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof
or by a copy attested by the official
having legal custody of the record, or
by his deputy, and in the absence of
judicial knowledge or competent evidence,
accompanied with a certificate that such
officer has the custody. If the office
in which the record is kept is within
the United States or within a territory
or insular possession subject to the
dominion of the United States, the certificate
may be made by a judge of a court of record
of the district or political subdivision
in which the record is kept, authenticated
by the seal of his office. If the office
in which the record is kept is in a foreign
state or country, the certificate may be
made by a secretary of embassy or legation,
counsul general, consul, vice consul, or
consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the United States stationed
in the foreign state or country in which
the record is dept, and authenticated by
the seal of his office.

-20-
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At no time during the evidenciary portion of the
trial did Appellant Stephenson offer into evidence the Ordinanc;
of Nephi City or Building Codes adopted by Nephi City.

Only

after Respondent Greenwood moved for a directed verdict did
Appellant refer to the Nephi City Ordinances and ask the Trial
Court to take judicial notice of the same.

Appellant offered

no foundation or testimony for such ordinances, nor did he offe
to place the published ordinance book into evidence.

Appellant

attorney merely read from an old book in his hands, which he
identified as a 1951 volume of ordinances, and a 1964 Uniform
Building Code, and claimed that such were applicable in 1973.
(T. 169)

The Utah Rules of Evidence provide that the Trial
Judge shall take judicial notice of duly enacted ordinances if
the requesting party "furnishes the judge sufficient informatic
to enable him to comply with the request," and if the requestir.
party "has given each adverse party such notice as the judge
may require to enable the adverse party to prepare to meet
the request."

Rule 9(3), Utah Rules of Evidence, states:
Judicial notice shall be taken of each
matter specified in paragraph (2) of
this rule if a party requests it, and
(a) furnishes the judge sufficient information to enable him properly to comply
with the request and (b) has given each
adverse party such notice as the judge
may require to enable the adverse party
to prepare to meet the request.
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Uniform Building Code was adopted by Nephi City, and required
such heating element to be 24 inches above the floor of any
room where flammables are used or stored.

The Appellant

refers to Nephi City Ordinances dated 1951, which adopted the
1949 Edition of the Uniform Building Code.

However, for some

strange reason, the Appellant then refers to the 1964 Short
Form Edition of the Uniform Building Code, and claims, without
evidence or foundation, that the same was used by Nephi City
and is applicable in this case.

(Appellant's Brief P. 6)

(It should be noted that the 1970 and 1973 Uniform
Building Codes changed the earlier requirement, and require the
heating element to be 18 inches above the floor of any room
in which flammables are stored or used.

(See Appendix A)

If

such codes are applicable, the water heater was not in violation
of such codes even after the wall was removed by Warner, since
the supply room floor was 6 inches higher than the rest of
the service station, which would give a total height of 22
inches, well above the 18 inch requirement.

Of course, if

Warner stored or used flammables in the storeroom area, then
there could be a violation, but this does not concern the
landlord, Greenwood, who had no knowledge of what Warner used
the storeroom are for or what was stored there.] (See Appendix A)

-18-
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POINT II. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF NEPHI CITY
ORDINANCES BEFORE THE COURT; NOR IS THERE ANY EVIDENCE THAT
RESPONDENT GREENWOOD VIOLATED ANY NEPHI CITY ORDINANCES.
Since the station was not defective when leased to
Warner, and since the only alleged violation of city ordinances
was created by Warner, the lessee, the Nephi City Ordinances
and Uniform Building Code are immaterial and irrelevant in
this appeal.

However, Respondent is compelled to respond to

Appellant's claims in this regard.
The Appellant, is Point II of his brief, and contrary
to the record and transcript, alleges that the landlord,

Green~

remodled his building and "installed" the car washing equipment
contrary to the applicable building code of Nephi City and is,
therefore, "guilty of affirmative wrongful condict" and
"creates a nuisance."

The Appellant also alleges, contrary to

all evidence, that Greenwood removed the separating wall,
thereby exposing the water heater to the lubrication bay, thus
constituting a nuisance.

The allegations made by the Appellant

are incorrect, and in some instances, totally false, as evidenc
by the testimony contained within the transcript.
A.

There is No Evidence of the Nephi City

Ordinance~

Before the Court.
The water heater heating element was 16 inches above
the supply room floor.

(T. 71-72)

Appellant claims that the
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represents an exception to the general
principles governing liability of a
lessor to his tenant's patrons, considering
the element of control, and this is
quite obvious, since the decision itself
cited many cases enunciating the general
rule and then indicated clearly that
this shooting gallery situation was an
exception thereto--almost in the same
category as a spring gun, so to speak.
We think that case, relied upon almost
entirely by plaintiff, is inapropos
under the facts of the instant case.
We prefer to refer the reader to cases
of our court which more nearly fit the
circumstances of the case here, which
we believe to be controlling.
(The Supreme Court cited Wilson v.
Woodruff, 65 Ut. 118, 235 P. 368, and
Reams v. Taylor, 31 Ut. 288, 87 P. 1089.)
It is clear from the evidence, and without any question
of fact, that when Greenwood leased the station to Warner,
the same was free from defect or nuisance.

If a defect or

nuisance existed at the time of the accident, such was created
by Warner and Appellant Stephenson when they tore down the
wall that separated the storage room from the rest of the
station.
It is submitted that even if the alleged defect had
existed at the time of the lease, the landlord could not be
held liable.

But the alleged defect having come into existence

by the actions of the lessee, Warner, it is even more certain
that the Trial Court did not err in granting Respondent Greenwood
motion for a directed verdict.
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building collapsed, injuring one lessee and killing another,
and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed a non-suit in favor of
the landlord-lessor.

The Court stated:

The general proposition is well settled
that in the absence of warranty, deceipt,
or fraud on the part of the landlord,
the lessee takes the risk of the quality
of the premises, and cannot make the
landlord answerable for any injury sustained
by him during his occupancy by reason of
the defective condition of the premises or
their faulty construction . .
In Montoya v. Berthana Investment Corp., supra, an
action was brought against the lessor, as well as the lessee,
of a skating rink, to recover for the death of a minor child.

It was alleged that the lessor was negligent in leasing premise~
which contained a dangerous condition, wherein an armrest of
a chair protruded out into the skating rink floor, creating a

n

danger for patrons, and also in allowing the lessee to operate
the rink in that condition.

The appellant in that case

relied~,

upon Larson v. Calder, supra, but the Utah Supreme Court held
that that case did not apply, and reaffirmed the principles

c
~

set forth in Wilson v. Woodruff, supra.

The Court stated:

The facts in Larson v. Calder and the
decisions therein, are so far afield
from the instant case as to preclude
that case from being any authority here.
There, a lessor leased a shooting gallery
to a tenant. The shooting gallery's
backstop had holes and cracks through which
anyone with common sense would know presented
a highly dangerous hazard to those who
might be using a walk on the other side
of a wooden backstop, oblivious to the
danger which a lessor reasonably should
have
known to exist. Larson v. Calder
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1105·1108
storage garages and aircraft hangars not exceeding an area of 5000
square feet, the Building Official may authorize the omission of such
ventilating equipment where, in his opinion, the building is supplied
with unobstructed openings to the outer air which are sufficient to provide the necessary ventilation.

Every building or portion thereof where persons are employed shall
be provided with at least one water closet. Separate facilities shall be
provided for each sex when the number of employees exceeds four and
both sexes are employed. Such toilet facilities shall be located either
in such building or conveniently in a building adjacent thereto on the
same property.
Such water closet rooms in connection with food establishments
"here food is prepared, stored, or served, shall have a nonabsorbent
interior finish on floors, walls, and ceilings and shall have hand washing
facilities therein or adjacent thereto.
All water closet rooms shall be provided with an exterior window
at least 3 square feet in area, fully openable; or a vertical duct not less
than 100 square inches in area for the first toilet facility with an additional 50 square inches for each additional toilet facility; or a mechanically operated e.xhaust system, which is connected to the light switch,
capable of providing a complete change of air every 15 minutes. Such
S) stems shall be vented to the outside air and at the point of discharge
shall be at least 5 feet from any openable window.
For other requirements on water closets, sec Section 1711.

Shaft Enclosures
Sec. 1106. Exits shall be enclosed as specified in Chapter 33.
Elevator shafts, vent shafts, and other vertical openings shall be
enclosed, and the enclosure shall be as specified in Section 1706.
Fire-extinguishing Systems
Sec. 1107. When required by other provisions of this Code, automatic fire-extinguishing systems and standpipes shall be installed as specified in Chapter 38.
Special Hazards
Sec. 1108. Chimneys and heating apparatus shall conform to the
requirements of Chapter 37- of this Code and the Mechanical Code
No storage of volatile flammable liquids shall be allowed in Group
F Occupancies and the handling and use of gasoline, fuel oil and other
Aammable liquids shall not be permitted in any Group F Occupancy
unless such use and handling comply with U.B.C. Standard No. 10-1.
Devices generating a glow or Harne capable of igniting gasoline
vapor shall not be installed or used within
·
s th
·
r

'

Every room containing a boiler or central heating plant shall be 1
separated from the rest of the building by not less than a One-Hour
Fire-Resistive Occupancy Separation.
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I hereby certify that I mailed two (2) copies of
the foregoing Respondent's Brief to Milton T. Harmon, Attorney
for Plaintiff-Appellant, 36 South Main Street, Nephi, Utah
84648, this

~day

of January, 1978 .
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